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Abstract 
 
Digital currencies and cryptocurrencies have hesitantly started to penetrate the 
investors, and the next step will be the regulatory risk management framework. We 
examine the Value-at-Risk and Expected Shortfall properties for the major digital 
currencies, Bitcoin, Ethereum, Litecoin, and Ripple. The methodology used is 
GARCH modelling followed by Filtered Historical Simulation. We find that digital 
currencies are subject to a higher risk, therefore, to higher sufficient buffer and risk 
capital to cover potential losses. 
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1. Introduction 
 
Digital currencies and cryptocurrencies have started to attract attention from 
the investors during the last years. Although there are about 800 different 
implementations that have surfaced, the market capitalization dominance, as of 31-
July-2017, is mostly on BitCoin (BTC, or XBT according to the ISO 4217 standard) 
by 51.14%, followed by Ethereum (ETH) 20.79%, Ripple 7.05% (XRP), and Litecoin 
2.47%. Digital currencies, except BTC, have not attracted much attention in the 
literature. A possible reasoning is that by the end of 2016 BTC was the dominant 
digital currency with 90% of market capitalization. This year, this dominance has 
been compromised by the rest of the digital currencies dropping BTC to almost half of 
the dominance percentage. The price formation of BTC has been studied by a variety 
of authors (Buchholz et al., 2012; Kristoufek (2013); van Wijk, 2013; Bouoiyour and 
Selmi 2015; Ciaian et al., 2016; Bouri et al. 2017), as well as, the interconnection 
between demand and supply (Buchholz et al. 2012; Bouoiyour and Selmi 2015). The 
main finding of these works is that BTC price is mostly driven by the interaction 
between supply and demand, and Kristoufek (2013) shows that standard economic 
theories cannot explain the price formation of BTC. Dyhrberg (2016a; 2016b) 
examined if BTC possesses some of the hedging abilities of gold, and whether or not 
it can be included in the variety of tools available to market analysts to hedge market 
specific risk. The high volatility of BTC price is considered to be the first bubble 
formation of a virtual currency. This was identified by Phillips et al. (2013), where 
using the generalized Sup ADF test, detected two bubbles during 2013 and another 
mini bubble during 2012. It appears that BTC is detached from macro-financial 
developments, having its own intrinsic risk. The inefficiency of the BTC market has 
been questioned by Urquhart (2016) and Nadarajah and Chu (2017). Urquhart (2016) 
working on an earlier sample concludes that BTC in an inefficient market but may be 
in the process of moving towards an efficient market. On the other hand, Nadarajah 
and Chu (2017) using an odd power transformation for the BTC returns, they indicate 
that BTC is actually market efficient. 
A critical issue with digital currencies is the fact that there is yet no regulation 
and no financial instruments. Also, with respect to the initial formal definition of BTC 
by Satoshi Nakamoto (2008), this peer-to-peer version of electronic cash would allow 
online payments without going through a financial institution. As a result, digital 
currencies and cryptocurrencies possess a very shadowy history, including 
accusations regarding securities theft, fraud, and criminal activity (Frunza, 2016). If 
an investor has a position in digital currencies then the next logical step is to quantify 
the risk and the capital requirements needed for future possible losses. Risk 
management has been the subject of a variety of Accords from the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision (BCBS) (bcbs107b, 2004; bcbs193a, 2011a). Value-at-Risk 
(VaR) has become a standard tool to quantify market risk, due to its simplicity to 
capture market risk by a single number. VaR is not subadditive violating the concept 
of diversification, and presents the problem of aggregation of compartmentalized risk 
in large financial institutions. Due to the fact that VaR is not a coherent measure of 
risk, Expected Shortfall (ES) emerged as a natural alternative (Acerbi & Tasche, 
2002) fulfilling all four axioms of a coherent risk measure set by Artzner et al. (1997, 
1999). This has been taken into account by BCBS (bcbs_wp19, 2011b; bcbs219, 
2012) and Basel III Committee agreed to replace the VaR with the Expected Shortfall 
for the internal model-based approach. In the same vein, the committee had to 
recalibrate the confidence level for consistency issues. Instead of using the 99% 
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confidence level for the VaR, the Basel III Committee recommends to use the 97.5% 
confidence level for the ES. 
The main contribution of this paper in the existing literature is to quantify for 
the first time VaR and ES, for BTC, ETH, XRP, and LTC, using Filtered Historical 
Simulation (FHS), (Barone-Adesi et al., 2002; Giannopoulos and Tunaru, 2005), and 
to compare the results with the Standard and Poor’s S&P500 as a proxy index. The 
remaining of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes the data and the 
econometric methodology used, Section 3 presents the results and discusses the 
findings, and Section 4 concludes.  
 
2. Econometric methodology 
 
2.1. The data 
 
BTC price data is sourced from Coindesk Price Index (coindesk.com), ETH, XRP, 
and LTC from coinmarketcap.com, and the Standard and Poor’s S&P500 index from 
finance.yahoo.com, from 8-Aug-2015 to 10-July-2017. All digital currencies trade 
seven days per week, and the missing values in the rest of the series are filled via 
sequential linear interpolation for the weekend data, following the procedure in 
Dyhrberg (2016a; 2016b). The series consist of 704 data entries and the returns are 
defined via the successive logarithmic differences of the close price. 
 
2.2. The model 
 
The dynamics of the AR(1)-GJR(1,1) model (Glosten et al., 1993) is expressed 
as follows: 
 
𝑟𝑡 = 𝜇 + 𝜑𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝜀𝑡 = 𝑟𝑡 = 𝜇 + 𝜑𝑟𝑡−1 + 𝜎𝑡𝑧𝑡     (1) 
 
𝜎𝑡
2 = 𝜔 + 𝑎𝜀𝑡−1
2 + 𝛾𝜀𝑡−1
2 𝐼(𝜀𝑡−1 < 0) + 𝛽𝜎𝑡−1
2      (2)  
 
where 𝑎 and 𝛽 are the ARCH and GARCH coefficients, 𝛾 is the leverage effect 
capturing the asymmetry effect in return volatility, and 𝐼 is an indicator function 
taking the value 1 when 𝜀𝑡−1 < 0 and zero otherwise, and the residuals follow the 
standardized Pearson type-IV (PIV) distribution (Stavroyiannis et al., 2012), 
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where Γ(∙) is the Gamma function and 𝑖 the imaginary unit. All programming has 
been performed with the Matlab, MathWorks® computing language.    
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3. Results of the econometric methodology 
 
3.1. Descriptive statistics and stylized facts 
 
The descriptive statistics of the returns are shown in Table 1. All series exhibit 
statistically significant skeweness and kurtosis, and the Jarque-Bera test shows 
deviation from normality. The ARCH test shows that all series exhibit 
heteroskedastivity. The Lung-Box test on the squared residuals is statistically 
significant for all series and shows the presence of autocorrelation. The returns show 
autocorrelation for the XRP and LTC. A striking difference of the virtual currencies 
with respect to S&P500 index is the one order of magnitude higher return and 
standard deviation. 
 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics of the return series. 
 
 
mean  std. skew. kurt. J.B. ARCH(12) LB(12) LB-2(12) 
S&P500 0.0002 0.007 -0.253* 9.245* 1150.* 12.53* 14.39 214.3* 
BTC 0.0031 0.031 -0.979* 8.445* 980.7* 7.549* 8.090 109.06* 
ETH 0.0081 0.075 0.685* 7.780* 723.2* 7.904* 20.39 146.61* 
XRP 0.0045 0.074 4.183* 67.80* 1.e+5* 8.006* 48.52* 114.34* 
LTC 0.0036 0.050 2.378* 24.41* 14088* 4.036* 28.94* 51.818* 
 
Notes: J.B. is the statistic for the null of normality; ARCH(12) denotes the test for 
heteroskedasticity, LB(12) denotes the Ljung–Box test statistic for serial correlation, 
LB-2(12) denotes the Ljung–Box test statistic for serial correlation on the squared 
residuals with 12 lags respectively. (*) denotes statistical significance at the 5% 
critical level. 
 
The correlations of the time series returns are shown in Table 2. 
 
Table 2 Correlations of the time series returns 
 
 S&P500 BTC ETH XRP LTC 
S&P500 1 -0.0292 -0.0080 -0.0130 0.0045 
BTC -0.0292 1 0.14801 0.5298 0.1054 
ETH -0.0080 0.14801 1 0.0949 0.0158 
XRP -0.0130 0.52982 0.0949 1 0.1745 
LTC 0.0045 0.10539 0.0158 0.1745 1 
 
The correlations of the digital currencies with the S&P500 proxy market is practically 
zero. The highest correlation is observed for the BTC-XRP pair (0.53), and the lowest 
correlation between the ETH-LTC pair (0.016). Ranking the rest of the correlations in 
a descending order we get BTC-ETH (0.15), XRP-LTC (0.17), BTC-LTC (0.10), and 
ETH-XRP (0.095).   
 
3.2. Univariate GARCH results 
 
The results of the univariate GARCH methodology are shown in Table 3. 
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Table 3 Results of the univariate GJR(1,1) model. 
 
 
S&P500 BTC ETH XRP LTC 
𝜇 2.2e-04 0.0024* 0.0031 -0.0016 0.0011 
𝜑 0.0845* -0.0911* 0.0279 -0.0035 -0.0936* 
𝜔 2.3e-05* 1.3e-05 2.6e-04 2.3e-04 2.1e-05 
𝑎  0.0000 0.2665* 0.2820* 0.5051 0.1855* 
𝛽  0.9065* 0.8488* 0.6983* 0.5562* 0.8937* 
𝛾  0.1903* -0.2232* 0.0429 -0.1296 -0.1679* 
𝜈 -0.0943 0.2439 -0.7575* -0.3397* -0.3125* 
𝑚  2.5570* 3.2421* 3.7934* 2.7649* 2.5237* 
 
(*) denotes statistical significance at the 5% critical level. 
 
The parameters 𝑎 and 𝛽 reflect the short run dynamics of the volatility. The ARCH 
coefficient 𝑎 is statistically significant for BTC, ETH, and LTC meaning that the 
volatility reacts to quite intensively to market movements. The GARCH coefficient 𝛽 
is statistically significant for all series, an indication that a shock to the conditional 
variance takes time to die-out. The leverage coefficient is statistically significant for 
S&P500, BTC, and LTC. The standardized residuals and the squared standardized 
residuals of the series do not possess any remaining autocorrelation, which is an 
important issue in order to apply FHS. 
 
3.3. VaR and Expected Shortfall 
 
A general approach to VaR and ES is either a calculation based on the 
historical simulation approach, ignoring the structure and distribution of the returns, 
or using Monte Carlo simulation on a parametric model for variance, incorporating a 
sufficiently large sample of random numbers from a specific distribution. The FHS 
methodology is a combination of both approaches via bootstrapping on the existing 
standardized residuals. After filtering out most of stylized facts via the AR(1)-
GJR(1,1) model, the VaR for a specific confidence level 𝜃 is the quantile that solves 
the equation 
 
𝑉𝑎𝑅(1 − 𝜃) = −𝑖𝑛𝑓{𝑞 ∈ 𝑅|𝐹𝑃𝐼𝑉(𝑥) ≥ 𝑞}                                                                         (6) 
 
where 𝐹𝑃𝐼𝑉 is the cumulative distribution of Eq.(3). The VaR levels for the long 
position for the 𝜃 confidence level are identified as 
 
𝑉𝑎𝑅(𝑙𝑜𝑛𝑔) = 𝜇𝑡 + 𝐹𝑃𝐼𝑉
−1 (1 − 𝜃)𝜎𝑡                                                                                       (7) 
 
where 𝐹𝑃𝐼𝑉
−1  is the inverse of the cumulative distribution function of Eq. (3) at the 
specific confidence level. The FHS is implemented as follows; firstly, the volatility of 
the asset is modeled via GARCH methodology as in Eq. (2), and the standardized 
residuals 𝑧𝑡 = 𝜀𝑡/𝜎𝑡 are computed. At this point an assumption about the distribution 
of the returns has to be made, and the PIV distribution is chosen. Secondly, instead of 
drawing random numbers from a specific distribution, the samples are drawn with 
replacement from the computed standardized residuals. Thirdly, using Eqs(1-2) the 
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hypothesized returns are constructed, and VaR and ES are calculated. For the FHS we 
consider 100000 trials, for a horizon of 10 trading days. ES is calculated via the 
Arcebi and Tasche (2002) approach,  
 
𝐸𝑆(1 − 𝜃) = −
1
[(1 − 𝜃)𝑁]
∑ 𝑋𝑖
†
[1−𝜃)𝑁]
𝑖=1
                                                                              (8) 
 
where the dagger symbol (†) denotes the ascending order sorting of the FHS, and [∙] is 
the integer part of the VaR level times the number of simulations. In agreement with 
the Basel III committee, since we report on both the VaR and ES, the results for VaR 
and ES for the long position are shown in Table 4, for 𝑉𝑎𝑅 = 1 − 𝜃 ∈ [0.10, 0.05, 
0.025, 0.01] in percentages.  
 
Table 4 VaR and Expected Shortfall 
 
 S&P500(%) BTC(%) ETH(%) XRP(%) LTC(%) 
VaR(0.10) 2.2107 5.5529 21.609 19.632 23.136 
ES(0.10) 4.3368 11.469 37.636 34.535 40.136 
VaR(0.05) 3.3170 9.3023 31.296 27.712 33.713 
ES(0.05) 5.9861 15.774 49.479 45.972 52.530 
VaR(0.025) 4.6509 13.445 42.132 37.004 45.370 
ES(0.025) 8.0838 20.460 62.936 60.227 66.209 
VaR(0.01) 7.1706 19.239 59.152 52.057 61.299 
ES(0.01) 11.790 27.247 83.592 86.036 87.232 
 
It is clear that the capital requirements of the digital currencies are higher that the 
S&P500 proxy market; however, BTC, due to the former market domination, appears 
to behave more stable than the other three digital currencies. As a next step of our 
analysis we test whether the aforementioned hypothesis of the Basel III committee 
holds for digital currencies. The hypothesis is that the quantity of risk measured by a 
99% VaR is approximately the same as a 97.5% ES. Looking at Table 4, we can 
confirm that the 99% VaR (the penultimate line) is almost equal to the 97.5% ES 
(third line from the end) for BTC and ETH, while XRP and LTC hold a larger gap.  
 
 
4. Conclusion 
 
This paper estimates the VaR and ES risk measures for a horizon of 10 days for the 
major digital currencies. An AR(1)-GJR(1,1) framework is specified to model the 
stylized facts of the autocorrelation of the returns, volatility clustering, and the 
asymmetry effect, and the risk measures are calculated using FHS. BCBS strives to 
strengthen the financial system against systemic risks and this will have implications 
on risk management and the cost of capital and liquidity. The capital adequacy rules 
set a minimum requirement on the size of the financial buffer based on the assumed 
risk. The financial system after the last crisis is susceptible to changes, and a 
controversial issue is whether the new digital currencies and cryptocurrencies will be 
regulated as new payments systems. Until these issues accomplish, an investor should 
be aware that a long position in digital currencies is subject to a much higher risk than 
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proxy markets; therefore, to higher sufficient buffer and risk capital to cover potential 
losses.    
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